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Introduction  
Since its rise in the 1990s, the idea of ‘good governance’ has become one of the 
leading paradigms in international development. Tropical forest conservation is no 
exception to this. ‘Bad’ governance – weak institutions, inefficiency, corruption and 
illegal activities – is now widely regarded as a major cause of deforestation; ‘good’ 
governance – institutional reform, the combat of corruption and crime and the 
promotion of efficiency, rule of law, transparency, accountability and participation – 
as the route towards forest protection. These principles have informed recent policy 
initiatives in tropical forest conservation in various ways.  Advocated and supported 
by the World Bank, UN and other donors, there has been a widespread shift towards 
decentralised and participatory forms of forest management, as greater participation is 
believed to reduce opportunities for mismanagement and corruption. In addition, a 
series of Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) initiatives have been 
formed since 2001, with the aim to ‘mobilise international commitment from both 
producer, consumer and donor governments to increase efforts to combat illegal 
logging […] and corruption in the forest sector’.1 Under the European Commission’s 
Action Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) bilateral 
voluntary partnership agreements (VPAs) between the EU and selected wood-
producing countries are being set up, supporting governance reform and the creation 
of licensing schemes to ensure that only legal timber could enter EU territory (Brown 
et al. 2008). Greenpeace, too, responsible for one of the first investigations into illegal 
logging in the 1990s, campaigns for the setting up and improvement of verification 
schemes. It argues that ‘weak governance and corruption in timber producing 
countries and the failure of governments in consumer countries like the EU, US and 
Japan to ban the import of illegally and destructively logged timber, allows 
unscrupulous logging companies and timber traders worldwide to exploit ancient 
forests.’2 The promotion of good governance is also a core component of the United 
Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation (UN-REDD and REDD+), which aims to prevent deforestation by 
creating a financial value for the carbon stored in old growth high forest. REDD+ 
activities and funding, as well as those of the related Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility, have so far focussed on helping producer governments to demonstrate their 
‘readiness’ to participate, through democratic governance, anti-corruption initiatives 
and improving transparency.  
 
However, despite its popularity and ubiquity the ‘good governance’ agenda has only 
partially, if at all, achieved its goals. Numerous studies have shown that community 
forest projects can be marred as much by elite capture, corruption and 
mismanagement as centralised forms of forest management, and do not necessarily 
improve forest protection (Charnley and Poe 2007; German et al. 2010). Timber 
verification schemes, too, are difficult to implement and have only had limited 
success so far (Brown et al. 2008). In international development in general, anti-
corruption measures and governance restructuring undertaken under the banner of 
‘good governance’ have, at best, had mixed results; in several African countries 
corruption has been on the increase since good governance reforms were introduced 
(Szeftel 1998; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006; Anders 2010), and there is little 
evidence so far that good governance actually fosters economic development (see also 
Gray and Khan 2010; Grindle 2010).  
 
In conjunction with empirical observations of its shortcomings, a number of powerful 
critiques of the good governance agenda in international development have emerged. 
Drawing on this larger critical literature, this chapter provides an overview of the 
ways in which environmental anthropology and related fields offer critical 
perspectives on good governance initiatives in forest conservation. Three main 
approaches, overlapping yet distinct, can be identified here. The first focuses on 
decentralised and participatory resource management projects and on their theoretical 
underpinnings, namely Common Pool Resources (CPR) theory. A second line of 
critique focuses more specifically on corruption and the way its role in deforestation 
is conceptualised. The third is provided by recent insights in ecology and historical 
ecology, which further problematize some key assumptions informing the good 
governance agenda in forestry. Before discussing each of these three approaches in 
detail, however, I begin with a brief account of the rise of the ‘good governance’ 
agenda in international development generally and forest conservation specifically. 
 
 
The emergence of the good governance agenda 
 
Several factors combined in bringing about the focus on governance in forest 
conservation. The overall interest in governance in recent decades is linked to the 
emergence of neoliberalism and its advocacy of privatisation, deregulation, and 
scaling down of state government. In fact, whilst the term governance can be used 
quite broadly to describe ‘a method of government or regulation’ irrespective of 
historical context, as the New Webster’s International Dictionary, for example, does 
(Weiss 2000: 795), it is also used specifically to describe only recent, neoliberal forms 
of governance that rely on a combination of public and private actors from the state, 
market, and civil society (Pierre and Peters 2000). The good governance agenda is 
rooted in this neoliberal understanding of governance, promoting as it does 
participation of civil society and the private sector in government. But it also presents 
a renewed recognition of the importance of institutions, emerging in response to the 
widespread failure of neoliberal structural adjustment programs in the Global South as 
well as the havoc caused by the unchecked eruption of capitalist market forces in the 
former Soviet bloc. ‘Bringing the state back in’, the good governance agenda is 
strongly informed by new institutional economics (Gray and Khan 2010; Grindle 
2010).  
 
In the promotion of good governance, the fight against corruption soon took center 
stage. This was epitomised by then World Bank President James Wolfensohn’s 
famous ‘Cancer of Corruption’ speech at the World Bank’s Annual Meeting in 1996, 
during which he identified corruption as a major hindrance to economic development. 
The 1990s also saw the establishment of the NGO Transparency International by Graf 
Lambsdorff (a former World Bank employee), which publishes the influential annual 
Corruption Perceptions Index. Initiatives such as these have helped to expose and 
draw attention to corruption to an unprecedented degree: anti-corruption initiatives 
are now not only a prerequisite for the receipt of development aid and loans, they 
have also become an integral part of domestic politics in many countries throughout 
the world (Werbner et al. 2014).  
 These trends coincided with a shift in the understanding of the causes of 
deforestation. Traditionally more focused on the destruction caused by small-scale 
farmers, the deforestation literature has begun to highlight the ‘underlying’ causes of 
deforestation (Contreras-Hermosila 2000; Geist and Lambin 2002), and to draw 
attention to deforestation caused by larger scale agricultural projects and industrial 
logging and the political processes behind these (Hecht and Cockburn 1990; 
Dauvergne 1993; Dove 1993; Klopp 2000; Rudel 2007). Much of this work is rooted 
in political ecology, the inter-disciplinary field concerned with the interaction 
between political economy and the environment (Peet and Watts 2004).  Meanwhile 
environmental anthropologists have also long challenged the orthodoxy that small-
scale farmers are the main agents of deforestation, by showing that many indigenous 
populations have sophisticated environmental knowledge and often manage their 
environments well, at times even contributing to forest increase and biodiversity (e.g. 
Conklin 1957; Posey 1985; Fairhead and Leach 1996; Guyer and Richards 1996).  
 
There is thus a powerful (and remarkable) convergence between a diverse range of 
actors and voices supporting the principles of good governance in conservation: 
World Bank economists, anthropologists, environmental and human rights activists all 
largely agree that it is the ‘underlying causes’ of deforestation that need to be tackled 
and that local people should have more control over their own resources. However, 
this new found common language of participation, accountability, transparency and 
sustainability has not translated into unmitigated success for good governance 
inspired forest conservation initiatives, and by now an important critical scholarship 
on the good governance agenda as a whole and its specific manifestations in forest 
conservation has emerged. This rest of this chapter examines in detail three key 
critiques, deriving both from the broader literature on the good governance agenda 
and corruption and from the concern and insights of environmental anthropology.  
 
Environmental governance beyond common pool resources theory 
 
The first line of critique focuses on the theoretical underpinnings of the recent drive 
for decentralisation and participation in natural resource management, namely 
Common Pool Resources (CPR) theory. Rooted in new institutional economics, CPR 
theory is most associated with the work of Elinor Ostrom (1990). On the basis of 
empirical research on pasture management in Kenya and irrigation systems in western 
Nepal, she showed that common pool resources could be successfully managed by 
locally developed common property regimes. Ostrom acknowledged that variability in 
human-ecosystem interaction meant there was no single institutional ‘panacea’, but 
identified eight ‘design principles’ that would ensure stable local common pool 
resource management. These principles include clearly defined boundaries, locally 
adapted rules, and the recognition of the community by higher-level authorities 
(ibid.).  
 
CPR theory has played a crucial role in challenging the ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
(Hardin 1968) hypothesis and its policy implications, namely that common pool 
resources require either state or private property regimes, and has given much impetus 
to the global drive towards decentralisation and participation in natural resource 
management, including tropical forest conservation. In Latin America and India 
community forestry already emerged in the 1970s and 80s, linked to indigenous rights 
and environmental movements as well as frustration with the shortcomings of 
centralised forest administration (Rival 2003; Charnley and Poe 2007). But World 
Bank and other donor support for such programmes under the banner of good 
governance, informed by CPR theory, has taken decentralisation much further in 
recent decades. In many parts of Africa, for example, forest decentralisation and the 
promotion of community participation is directly linked to donor conditionalities 
(Charnley and Poe 2007; German et al. 2010) .  
 
However, in view of the limited tangible success of many recent participatory 
initiatives, a growing body of work has begun in turn to critique the simplistic 
application of CPR theory, focusing in particular on the rigidity with which it 
distinguishes between formal and informal institutions, its ahistorical, apolitical and 
decontextualized understanding of institutions, and its valorisation of ‘the 
community’ (Mehta et al. 2001; Arts and Visseren-Hamakers 2012).  
Informed by historical, sociological, anthropological and political ecology 
approaches, a number of authors have put forward alternative, more nuanced 
understandings of how environmental governance actually works in practice, focusing 
on the ‘messy middle’ (Mehta et al. 2001) between formal and informal 
arrangements. Thus, Cleaver suggests that ‘real governance’ (Cleaver et al. 2013) is 
best understood as ‘institutional bricolage’, the uneven patching together of old 
practices and accepted norms with new arrangements (Cleaver 2001; Cleaver 2012). 
Steins (2001) draws on Actor Network Theory (ANT) to explore how individuals 
interact with human and non-human ‘actors’ in natural resource management, whilst 
Li (2007) uses the analytic of ‘assemblages’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987) to capture 
the complex dynamics of practices involved in community forestry. Others employ 
Bourdieu’s (1990) theory of practice to analyse contemporary practices in natural 
resource management (e.g. Zimmer and Sakdapolrak 2012; Caine 2013).  
 
As well as conceptualising environmental governance in processual, practice-based 
terms, such critical works also draw attention to power relations. Power is often 
remarkably absent in official ‘good governance’ programmes and policy statements, 
including forest-related ones; in fact, Li (2007) identifies ‘anti-politics’ (Ferguson 
1990) as one of her key ‘practices’ in contemporary community forestry.  In general 
interventions under the banner of ‘good governance’ are presented as technical, 
bureaucratic measures, thereby providing something of a ‘figleaf’ (Grindle 2010) for 
what are often heavily political interferences (Brown and Cloke 2004). Cloaked in the 
language of participation, devolution, and civil society involvement, good governance 
actually presents ever more pervasive forms of power (Orlandini 2003). This line of 
analysis draws theoretically on Foucault’s concepts of governmentality and biopower, 
the idea that government is about letting subjects govern themselves, ‘the conduct of 
conduct’ (Foucault 2000; Arts and Visseren-Hamakers 2012). Foucauldian 
approaches have also been important in critical analyses of decentralisation in natural 
resource management. Thus Agrawal (2005a; 2005b) uses the term 
‘environmentality’ to describe how villagers develop environmental consciousness 
through their involvement in community forest councils, and how through this 
consciousness they become willing agents of government forest conservation policies; 
how ‘technologies of self and power are involved in the creation of new subjects 
concerned about the environment’ (Agrawal 2005b: 166).  
 
The anti-politics of the good governance agenda are not just about disguising global 
forms of power with technocratic language, they are also manifest in a lack of 
appreciation by policy-makers of local politics and power relations. Leftwich argues 
that good governance proponents are politically naïve to believe that a few measures 
can address governance problems, since ‘good governance is not simply available on 
order, but requires a particular kind of politics both to institute and sustain it’ 
(Leftwich 1993: 607; cited in Corbridge 2005: 186), a politics that is, almost by 
definition, absent in the places where good governance programmes are being 
implemented (see also Szeftel 1998). The same critique applies to the idealised 
conceptualisation of ‘the community’ that informs the promotion of participatory 
projects and mainstream CPR theory itself (Sharpe 1998; Agrawal and Gibson 1999; 
Charnley and Poe 2007). Local communities, in forest areas like anywhere else, are 
difficult to define, heterogeneous, conflict-ridden, and shaped by uneven power 
relations. Working with ‘the community’ in forest conservation in practice often 
means working with powerful men, thus effectively reinforcing existing inequalities. 
New work on environmental governance therefore seeks to provide ways of taking 
account of local politics and power relations (e.g. Zimmerer and Sakdapolrak; Mehta 
et al. 2001; Agrawal 2003).  
 
There is also a growing recognition of the need for a more historically contextualised 
understanding of current forest reform than CPR inspired mainstream resource 
management analyses provide (Mehta et al. 2001; Agrawal 2003; Batterbury and 
Fernando 2006). In fact, the existing historical and political ecology literature on 
scientific forestry and its adoption in colonial Asia and Africa can provide pertinent 
insights into contemporary reform efforts. For one, it shows that scientific forestry 
was an integral part of the rise of the modern state; a key arena of new forms of 
governmentality emerging in 17th and 18th century Europe. For this reason James 
Scott begins Seeing Like a State, his seminal study of large (and failed) state-led 
projects of rural and urban transformation, with a chapter on scientific forestry, using 
it as ‘something of a model’ for the processes he is concerned with (Scott 1998: 11). 
In a similar vein colonial forestry, built on French and German principles of scientific 
forestry, has been examined as a form of colonial ‘statemaking’ (Sivaramakrishnan 
1999) and territorialisation (Vandergeest and Peluso 2006b; 2006a).  Bryant discusses 
colonial forestry in Burma as an example of the kind of ‘formal rationalisation’ 
Weber is concerned with, as ‘this process of enhanced control over nature and people 
through non-revolutionary change is nowhere more evident than in the doctrine of 
scientific forestry’(Bryant 1998: 829).  
  
These reminders of the roots of forestry in modern state practice are important 
because despite the recent shift towards more participatory approaches, several of its 
key principles actually remain unchanged. For example, even if by now many former 
government-run forest reserves have been put under community control, the principle 
of reservation itself, that an area of forest is demarcated and rights of access are 
heavily curtailed, largely remains integral to forest protection, both in biodiversity 
conservation and timber production oriented forest management. In this context, it is 
important to remember that government reserves were first and foremost necessary 
for the practice of scientific forestry, which required complete control over forest 
tracts. As will be discussed in more detail below, the actual ecological benefits of 
reservation, both in terms of ensuring a regular timber supply and of preserving 
biodiversity, cannot always be taken for granted.   
 
Historical studies also show that, despite forestry’s centrist origins and orientation, 
decentralisation is in fact not new. In parts of West Africa, local authorities were put 
in charge of forest administration from the 1920s onwards (Wardell and Lund 2006; 
von Hellermann and Usuanlele 2009). It would, however, be misleading to assume 
that these early decentralisation initiatives presented actual community engagement; 
in the Benin Division in southern Nigeria, the native authority put in charge of 
forestry was the Oba (king) of Benin, whose urban based administration did not 
include local communities living in or near forests (von Hellermann and Usuanlele 
2009). It is nevertheless illuminating to study these early decentralisation policies. 
The limits of actual power devolved, the struggles over revenue and labour, and the 
motivation and tactics of colonial administration as well as native authorities in many 
ways anticipate contemporary dynamics and problems with decentralisation efforts. 
Bose, Arts and van Dijk (2012) explore a different aspect of the historical roots of 
contemporary decentralisation efforts, by showing how they employ wider social 
categories created in the colonial period, namely those of ‘scheduled tribes’ in India.   
 
Finally, wider political economic and ecological context, too, shapes the trajectory 
and outcomes of institutional reforms, a wider context that is often missed in the 
narrow focus on ‘design principles’ in mainstream CPR approaches. Thus Mehta et al 
(2001) stress that the contemporary world is characterised by fundamental ecological, 
economic and political uncertainty, and that this uncertainty needs to be taken into 
account in natural resource management analyses. In her contribution to their volume, 
Li (2001), for example, discusses how agrarian change in the context of the global 
cocoa boom of the 1990s had a far more profound effect on rural livelihoods and land 
management practices than institutional reform in the forest sector. Environmental 
changes, too, can shape policy outcome far more than institutional design itself 
(Agrawal 2007; Charnley and Poe 2007). I will discuss in the last section how new 
insights in ecology and historical ecology can further help to understand current 
governance reforms in their wider ecological context.  
 
Corruption 
 
With the fight against corruption high on the agenda in policy circles and the media in 
the 1990s there came a marked increase in academic interest in corruption. 
Anthropologists, too, traditionally shying away from the subject (Haller and Shore 
2005: 7), began to discuss corruption. There is now a distinct anthropology of 
corruption (for overviews, see Pardo 2004; Haller and Shore 2005; Blundo and 
Olivier de Sardan 2006; Nuijten and Anders 2007). Methodologically and 
theoretically, anthropology can make a very valuable contribution not only to our 
understanding of corruption as a whole, but also to critically assessing the current 
focus on the combat of corruption in forest conservation.  
 
Thus, a prominent theme in the anthropology of corruption is the analysis of 
corruption discourses and their political uses (Haller and Shore 2005). Here, an 
important body of work analyses global corruption discourses, in particular the good 
governance agenda and recent anti-corruption campaigns. Elizabeth Harrison points 
out that the focus on corruption ‘provides a neat explanation for the ills of both 
countries and continents that leaves moral culpability entirely with the supposedly 
corrupt’ (Harrison 2007: 676). Similarly, the current focus on ‘bad governance’ as a 
key cause of deforestation continues to blame locals, no longer poor farmers but 
corrupt forest officials and politicians. Just as powerful environmental crisis 
narratives served to justify colonial and post-colonial conservation intervention 
(Leach and Mearns 1996), so, arguably, the identification of corruption as a key cause 
of deforestation presents the combination of both environmental and political crisis 
narratives, again used to justify political and environmental intervention (von 
Hellermann 2007). (see als Fortmann 2005) 
 
A second key contribution of anthropology has been in exploring the links between 
social norms, culture, moral economy, and corruption. Overall, anthropologists have 
been at pains to disassociate themselves from the idea that corruption in Africa, for 
example, is rooted in a ‘culture of corruption’, and only few have tackled this topic 
directly (Smith 2007). Instead of evoking a ‘culture of corruption’, Olivier de Sardan 
(1999) argues that the moral economy of Africa, in particular the logics of gift giving, 
brokerage, solidarity networks, predatory authority and redistributive accumulation, 
serve to banalise and generalise corruption. Generally anthropologists have helped to 
point out that corruption, and indeed good governance, are not understood by all 
people in the same way, but that such ideas are socially embedded (Poluha and 
Rosendahl 2002; Orlandini 2003; Haller and Shore 2005; Siegel 2011). Such 
approaches are also relevant for understanding ‘corrupt’ practices in forestry. In 
southern Nigeria, my own research showed how social relations between forest staff, 
loggers and farmers are deeply embedded in local social and political practices. The 
allocation of Taungua land, for example, is often accompanied by the eating of kola 
nut and a drink of ‘hot’ (local gin) to facilitate and seal the deal. Logging allocations 
are strengthened by the regular exchange of large greeting cards and calendars, 
prominently displayed in offices of loggers and forest staff alike, as well as the less 
overt but even more important flow of ‘gifts’ from loggers to forest staff, and they are 
generally shaped by and an integral part of patrimonial relations rooted in the Benin 
Kingdom (von Hellermann 2013). Legal pluralism in access to land, such as it exists 
in many parts of Africa, can also facilitate licensing ambiguity and therefore illegal 
logging practices (Siebert and Elwert 2004). 
 
As well as bringing out how ‘corrupt’ practices may be socially embedded, 
ethnographic work also, thirdly, helps to achieve a more nuanced, differentiated, and 
sector specific understanding of corruption, showing that even in one locality, there is 
never just one moral economy shaping everyone’s behaviour. Anders (2004) explores 
how civil servants in Malawi have different moral reference points shaping their 
practices and perceptions, with considerable variation between different individuals, 
and indeed, within individuals in different situations. Similarly, my research in 
southern Nigeria showed that forest officers do not all have the same attitudes and do 
not participate in corrupt practices in the same way: some are far more committed to 
forest conservation and correct procedures than others. There is also considerable 
condemnation of corrupt and illegal practices amongst villagers, which sometimes 
results in active obstruction and resistance to illegal loggers (von Hellermann 2013: 
120-121).  
 
Moreover, ethnographic work helps to distinguish between grand and petty forms of 
corruption, a distinction that is often curiously absent from good governance 
discourses (Walton 2013). Yet it is important to make distinctions: an Edo farmer 
providing the visiting forest officer with kola nut, ‘hot’ and a ‘dash’ in order to obtain 
2 ha instead of the 1 ha of Taungya land he is officially allowed, is not the same, in 
nature and scale, as state ministers awarding many square miles of reserve land to 
political cronies (von Hellermann 2007). Finally, sector-specific ethnographic 
research helps to show how particular practices are rooted as much in sector-specific 
policies and institutions as in local moral economy, if not more.  Timber logging, for 
example, is regulated by a system of on the ground ‘stamping’ by forest officers to 
mark legally felled trees, a system which has been subject to abuse throughout its 
history, in 18th century France (Rochel 2005) as much as in contemporary Nigeria. 
Equally the widely used concession system, whereby loggers gain a license for 
logging a particular piece of forest for a particular piece of time, is intrinsically prone 
to patronage as well as informal, additional uses (see also Hardin 2011).  
 
In this respect, a fourth point raised by the anthropology of corruption is particularly 
pertinent, namely the need to understand contemporary practices in historical context. 
There is a general tendency to associate corrupt practices with recent, post-
independence governments in Africa, but in fact colonial administrations, generally 
run on a shoe string, were often governed in a slap dash, arbitrary manner and saw 
widespread corruption and illegal activities (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Blundo and 
Olivier de Sardan 2006). In Nigeria, there were regular incursions by farmers into 
reserved land throughout the colonial period and the 1950s saw a huge rise in illegal 
logging, just when the colonial forest department had finally succeeded in putting all 
reserves under highly detailed ‘working plans’ regulating all logging and forest 
regeneration activities (von Hellermann 2013). But as already discussed above, 
logging regulations have been prone to abuse throughout the world for as long as they 
have existed (e.g. Rochel 2005). An appreciation of the long term history of 
corruption in forestry also adds new perspectives on a well-entrenched but limiting 
debate about the roots of corruption in post-colonial countries, whether it is ‘the 
modern state [that] is corrupted by traditional culture or traditional culture [that] is 
corrupted by the advent of the modern state’ (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006: 
29). As an examination of forestry shows it may be neither, because contemporary 
practices have even deeper, sector-specific roots.  
 
Finally, again mirroring critiques of CPR theory, my research in southern Nigeria also 
highlighted the need for understanding ‘corrupt’ practices in their wider economic and 
political context. Since the 1980s and 1990s, economic decline and widespread 
‘entrenchment’ and financial shortages in the public sector have brought with them a 
drastic drop in employment opportunities and pensions, forcing many people to return 
to farming ‘for survival’, creating a huge demand for farmland. Local demand for 
timber, too – for years fostered by the colonial forest department – is now huge, Edo 
state’s economy is also heavily dependent on the timber industry, with over 200 saw 
mills and countless carpenters and furniture makers working in Benin City.  
 
Yet whilst southern Nigeria has seen significant economic and demographic shifts 
over the last few decades – with Nigeria’s population more than tripling between 
1963 and 2013 – official policies and procedures in forestry have largely remained 
unchanged, a phenomenon also observed by Anders (2004) in his study of the civil 
service in Malawi. Moreover, there are generally few democratic channels available 
for ordinary citizens to influence or change policy. In this context, the only way in 
which citizens can effectively change policy is through informal, ‘corrupt’ alterations 
of official policy on the ground. This point was already made much earlier by James 
Scott (1969), who suggested that, where interest structures and institutionalised forms 
through which demands can be made are weak or non-existent, a sizeable number of 
demands reach the political system after laws are passed, at the enforcement stage.  
 
Thus since the 1980s, the Taungya system in Edo State has not been practiced as 
originally designed by colonial foresters: whilst it continues to flourish as a system of 
land allocation, no trees are planted, more land is allocated to farmers than officially 
allowed, and farms are re-allocated every three years. Its transformation is often 
described as one of forestry’s biggest failures in Edo State. However, this new form 
of Taungya has played a significant role in meeting the large rise in demand for 
subsistence farmland, in a remarkably peaceful and straightforward way (von 
Hellermann 2007). Similarly, the many cocoa and plantain farms that have sprung up 
in Okomu reserve in recent decades are indeed ‘illegal’, but they provide a vital 
source of livelihood for the many small scale farmers and traders involved, with the 
plantain farms (largely unknown by higher up forest officers), transporting thousands 
of tons of plantain to Lagos every week. Some of these important functions of 
informal ‘corrupt’ and ‘illegal’ practices that have emerged on the ground have been 
belatedly recognised in policy: a 1994 edict allowed Taungya farmers to return to the 
same piece of land, and in 2006 the Edo State department started granting licenses to 
cocoa farmers in Okomu reserves (von Hellermann 2013). These developments are 
reminiscent of Mosse’s analysis that development policy changes are in practice often 
made from below, rather than top-down (Mosse 2004). 
 
This kind of pragmatic interpretation of corruption is somewhat unfashionable at the 
moment. In contrast to the 1960s, when there was a debate between ‘functionalist’ 
and ‘moralistic’ analyses of corruption (Farrales 2005), there is a nearly universal 
consensus now that the effects of corruption are detrimental. Yet ethnographic work 
in the forest sector shows that this is not always the case; some ‘corrupt’ practices can 
be viewed in a different light. In addition to the social and economic effects just 
discussed, an in-depth examination of the ecological outcomes of corruption further 
challenges received wisdom on the effects of corruption.  
 
 
New ecologies and forest governance  
 
The overall aim of the good governance agenda in forestry is, of course, to improve 
forest protection. Mismanagement and corruption result in deforestation, so 
combating corruption and establishing rule of law, it is reasoned, will protect forests. 
True, there is no doubt that uncontrolled logging and especially the large-scale 
conversion of forests to agricultural uses do significantly contribute to deforestation. 
Nevertheless, the connections between ‘bad governance’ and deforestation, and ‘good 
governance’ and forest protection, are not always as self-evident as they seem. On the 
ground observations by foresters and anthropologists as well as conceptual shifts in 
ecology as a whole unsettle some of the key assumptions informing the ‘good 
governance’ agenda, and suggest that, from an ecological point of view, too, a more 
nuanced and differentiated understanding of what constitutes ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forest 
governance is required.  
 
Modern forestry is based on the assumption that forests are stable environments, 
which through the application of scientific methods can be managed in such a way so 
as to ensure long-term sustainable yields. A key condition for this is that forests are 
protected from all human disturbances other than expert treatment methods and 
carefully regulated logging. For much of the 20th century, the idea that forests are 
stable, ‘climax’ ecosystems was also core to the discipline of ecology, rooted as it was 
in a fundamental belief in the balance of nature. Since the 1970s, however, something 
of a paradigm shift has occurred amongst ecologists; now disequilibrium and 
instability are increasingly seen as the defining characteristics of ‘nature’ (Botkin 
1990; Sprugel 1991).  
 
At the same time the subfield of historical ecology emerged, like political ecology, as 
a critical response to cultural ecology, but also as a critique of ecology’s traditional 
focus on environments undisturbed by humans. Thinking about ecology historically 
and bringing together environmental anthropologists, ecologists and archaeologists, 
historical ecology research has powerfully shown just how fundamentally all 
environments, including all forests, are shaped by humans and how the impact of 
humans on forest growth and biodiversity can be positive as well as negative (Balée 
2006).  
 
Informed by these insights, localised historical and ethnographic studies can further 
unsettle established ideas of what constitutes good and bad forest management. In 
Nigeria’s Edo State, forests were seemingly managed well in the colonial period: over 
64% of land was under reservation by the 1930s, and from the 1940s onwards 
carefully drawn up working plans regulated logging activities and prescribed timber 
regeneration methods. In recent decades, however, reserves have officially shrunk to 
less than 20%, and there is widespread illegal farming and logging in what remains. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that the Conservation Atlas of Tropical Forests states that 
Nigeria’s ‘natural forests were carefully managed in the early part of the century, 
[but] they have since been severely over-exploited’ (Lowe et al. 1992: 230; see also 
Oates 1999). This view is widely shared by conservationists, foresters and local 
people alike, who all participate in this particular version of the much repeated 
Nigerian ‘things fall apart’ narrative: that forests were managed well in the colonial 
period and that political decline in recent decades has caused environmental 
destruction. But this is not, in fact, correct.  
 
The colonial forest department not only experienced financial and staff shortages, 
numerous delays, internal conflict, illegal logging and corruption: my archival 
research showed that even in its most successful periods, colonial forest management 
did not result in actual forest protection. It was widespread shifting cultivation in the 
pre-colonial period that had created the conditions for the abundant growth of 
mahogany and many other timber species, which are light-demanding in their early 
stages and grow best in opened areas. In this context, forest reservation effectively 
curtailed the conditions that had facilitated the regeneration of timber species. Inside 
reserves, now no longer farmed, timber species could not regenerate well under the 
closed forest canopy, whilst outside reserves farming necessarily intensified, 
shortening fallow periods and reducing opportunities for timber species to fully 
regenerate here, too. The separation of forests and farmland that forest reservation 
created thus protected forest tracts but not trees overall, and particularly not timber 
species, the very ones colonial foresters were interested in.  
 
Working plans, too, did not constitute successful environmental stewardship: the 
extensive application of arborial treatment did not improve regeneration inside 
reserves (see also Plumptre 1996). Moreover, the cooperation of logging companies in 
these restrictive plans was only gained by the introduction of ‘salvage felling’, 
completely unregulated felling outside reserves. The staggeringly large volume of 
trees subsequently felled outside reserves – supplying the vast majority of timber 
exported during the 1950s ‘timber boom’ – strongly suggest that this was not so much 
‘salvage’ as the rapid large scale removal of all the timber trees in the countless small 
forest plots on community land. Upon close inspection, therefore, colonial forest 
management, well organised and orderly as it might have been, did not in any way 
present sustainable management.  
 
The environmentally destructive effects of mismanagement and corruption in more 
recent decades, meanwhile, are not a given, either. For example, one needs to 
differentiate between different forms of forest conversion. Illegal small scale cocoa 
and plantain farmers in Okomu Reserve in Western Edo State, frequently condemned 
as a major source of forest destruction, compare rather well to the oil palm and rubber 
monocultures established on large scale plantations, in that both cocoa and plantain 
farmers leave a substantial amount of original trees and plants, and are much more 
biodiverse (Schroth and Harvey 2007). Actual oil palm and rubber plantations in turn 
are still better, in terms of biomass, than forest areas that were cleared but never 
planted; these wastelands, of which there are quite a few in Edo State, are a far cry 
from ‘illegal’ plantain farms inside effectively still high forest.  Moreover, indirect 
ecological effects outside reserves need to be considered too. Thus Taungya farming 
as it is practiced today does result in forest clearance inside reserves, but it also allows 
farmers to prolong fallow periods on community land, resulting in quite substantial 
forest regeneration. Informal Taungya arrangements on the ground therefore provide 
opportunities for community-based conservation practices that would otherwise not 
exist.  
 
Of course, not all instances of corruption can be reinterpreted in this way: if a political 
crony of a State minister is given a large area of reserved forest land, clears and then 
abandons it, or if more and more trees of smaller and smaller girth sizes are felled for 
timber, there are few environmental and indeed social benefits. Nevertheless, it is 
important to recognise that the links between corruption and environmental 
destruction are not inevitable. Indeed, there is a growing recognition of the need for 
more empirical research into the actual outcomes of corruption in natural resource 
management (Robbins 2000; Corbridge and Kumar 2002; Robbins et al. 2006; 
Robbins et al. 2009).  
 
Conclusion  
The three critical perspectives presented here do not challenge the overall validity of 
the good governance agenda in forest management: accountability, participation, 
transparency, rule of law and sustainability all remain worth striving for. Rather, they 
highlight shortcomings in the ways in which these goals are currently conceptualised 
and approached by policy makers. The critical scholarship on CPR theory shows how 
disappointing outcomes of its practical applications are linked to a preoccupation with 
institutional design, without sufficient appreciation of historical, politico-economic 
and indeed ecological context. Anthropological approaches to corruption challenge us 
to think more carefully about the different ways in which forest policies and laws are 
subverted, again highlighting the need for a historically contextualised understanding 
of contemporary ‘corrupt’ practices. Historical ecology research and new approaches 
in ecology, finally, raise questions about the ecological assumptions underlying the 
good governance agenda.  
 
Each of these three approaches is quite distinct in its intellectual roots, concerns and 
affiliations, and therefore offers quite different insights. Yet all three are firmly 
situated within environmental anthropology, indeed testament to the field’s breadth 
and versatility. It is through its ability to draw on such different approaches – from 
within anthropology but also many other social and natural sciences – that 
environmental anthropology is perhaps particularly well equipped to provide us with a 
critical, holistic understanding of the shortcomings of the good governance agenda in 
tropical forest conservation. At the same time, the good governance agenda presents a 
fruitful focus for thinking through different strands of environmental anthropology 
and exploring their effective combination.  
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